Rights at United States Borders by Adams, Jon
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 19 | Issue 2 Article 3
3-1-2005
Rights at United States Borders
Jon Adams
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jon Adams, Rights at United States Borders, 19 BYU J. Pub. L. 353 (2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol19/iss2/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
353 
 
Rights at United States Borders 
 
Jon Adams*
 
Table of Contents 
 
I.  Introduction 353 
 
II. Scope of the Border Search Exception  
 
354 
 
     A. The Border Exception to the Fourth Amendment 
 
354 
     B. What are “Routine” Stops and Searches 356 
          1. Permitted duration of border searches 357 
          2. Permitted intrusiveness of border searches 359 
          3. Impermissible motives for border searches   360  
     C. Detaining Property 361 
     D. Reasonableness of Border Stops and Searches 362 
          1. Facts as a whole considered 362 
          2. Legal standard for reasonable suspicion 363 
          3. Factors used to evaluate reasonable suspicion 364 
          4. Reasonable suspicion with respect to contraband 365 
E. Limitation of Border Search Exception to Customs and 
Immigration Laws 
366 
 
III. Fifth Amendment Rights During Border Searches  
 
367 
 
     A. Miranda 
 
368 
     B. Detention of Property and Miranda 370 
 
IV. Forfeiture of Property 
 
370 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
371 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Should Americans be happy with border searches because they truly 
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serve the public good, or do searches needlessly eviscerate Constitutional 
protections? Does the Border Search Exception really accomplish the 
goals it seeks to achieve and prevent illegal items and aliens from 
crossing the border? Or, on balance, do border searches sacrifice 
individual liberties without any meaningful protective benefit to 
American citizens or for a small benefit at a great cost? 
United States customs agents cannot detain a person longer than 
necessary to conduct a routine inspection without implicating the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Routine 
customs inspections are directed at determining whether any 
impermissible items are being brought into the United States and whether 
any persons are attempting to illegally enter the United States.1 A routine 
customs stop or search requires neither reasonable suspicion nor 
probable cause. However, nonroutine border searches and border 
searches having an improper motive do implicate the Fourth 
Amendment. Furthermore, any person asked to complete an extra form 
or declaration, not pursuant to routine customs search and procedure, can 
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; 
especially when the only clear purpose of completing such a form is the 
incrimination of the person completing it. If customs agents take any 
property during a border search, a receipt must be given, and a specific 
procedure must be followed, including notifying the person deprived of 
the property the process for retrieving the property.2
This Article is divided into three sections. Part II focuses on the 
extent to which customs agents may detain or search a person in 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Part III discusses when 
Miranda warnings must be given and whether a person has a Fifth 
Amendment right to refuse to complete an additional declaration, the 
purpose of which is self incrimination. Part IV analyzes whether customs 
agents can take a person’s possessions, and, if they do, the procedure 
necessary for retaining and returning the possessions. 
 
II.  SCOPE OF THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION 
 
A.  The Border Exception to the Fourth Amendment 
 
Routine stops and searches are permissible under the “border 
exception” at any point of entry into the United States, including 
 1. “Impermissible items” include items that are illegal in the United States – the most 
common being drugs. 
 2. See infra  Part IV. 
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international airports.3 The border search exception applies equally to 
passengers both departing and arriving in the United States.4 “[R]outine 
searches of the persons and effects of entrants [at international borders] 
are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable 
cause, or warrant.”5 However, only Customs, Immigration, and Coast 
Guard officials may make routine searches and seizures at a border.6
The border exception is based on the power granted by the 
Constitution to Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations.”7 This power has historically been exercised to “prevent 
smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry”8 into the United 
States. In view of Congress’ power to regulate international commerce, 
the Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively 
different at the international border than in the interior.9
The general seizure rules do not apply to border seizures to the 
extent that a border search requires a particular seizure.10 However, after 
the completion of a valid, routine border search, or after the completion 
of a more detailed search and seizure supported by reasonable suspicion, 
the person subjected to the valid search and seizure must be allowed to 
depart.11 Any further detention violates the Fourth Amendment.12
 3. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); United States v. Tehrani, 
826 F. Supp. 789 (D. Vt. 1993), aff’d, 49 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 4. United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1991) (border search exception to the 
Fourth Amendment applies to persons exiting or entering the country); United States v. Benevento, 
836 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 5. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (“[S]earches made at the border . . . are reasonable simply by 
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border . . . .”); United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 140 
(3d Cir.1991); see also Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (stating that the executive branch 
has “plenary authority” to conduct warrantless routine searches “in order to regulate the collection of 
duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country”); United States v. Johnson, 
991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that no articulable suspicion required for Customs 
agents to conduct routine luggage search at border); United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 267 
(2d Cir. 1989) (requiring neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion for Customs officials to 
conduct routine border search of personal belongings and effects); United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 
973, 976 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that routine searches at the border are acceptable at the border even 
without reasonable suspicion). 
 6. United States v. Sandoval Vargas, 854 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988), distinguished on 
other grounds, United States v. Taghizadeh, 41 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 7. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 8. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531. 
 11. United States v. Bews, 715 F. Supp. 1206, 1211 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment where border patrol agents searched the travel bag of an alien suspected of 
traveling in the United States for an illegal purpose after the alien provided proper identification and 
explained purpose of visit); United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding no 
Fourth Amendment violation where search lasted no longer than necessary to perform a valid routine 
search); United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that detention after a 
ticket for having tinted windows was issued, violated the Fourth Amendment). 
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Immigration officials are authorized to conduct warrantless searches 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c), which states, in relevant part: 
 
[a]ny officer or employee of the Service . . . shall have power to 
conduct a search, without warrant, of the person, and of the personal 
effects in the possession of any person seeking admission to the United 
States, concerning whom such officer or employee may have 
reasonable cause to suspect that grounds exist for denial of admission 
to the United States under this chapter which would be disclosed by 
such search.13
 
B.  What are “Routine” Stops and Searches? 
 
Although routine stops and searches are exempted from Fourth 
Amendment protection, further detention or search is subject to some 
Fourth Amendment protection. To determine if any Fourth Amendment 
protections attach, it is necessary to determine what is a routine search 
and when a search becomes nonroutine and unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment due to lack of reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause.14 Ordinarily, a stop or search more extensive than a routine search 
requires reasonable suspicion,15 and a full arrest demands probable 
cause.16
Courts rarely find a sufficient level of intrusiveness to render a 
general border search nonroutine.17 A routine, preliminary search may 
include investigating a person’s luggage, personal belongings, outer 
clothing, wallet, purse, and even a person’s shoes.18 Officials may 
 12. See Bewes, 715 F. Supp. at 1211; Ek, 676 F.2d at 381; Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 878. 
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (2005). 
 14. See Bewes, 715 F. Supp. at 1210; Ek, 676 F.2d at 382; Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 878; infra 
note 36. 
 15. See Bewes, 715 F. Supp. at 1210; Ek, 676 F.2d at 382; Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 878. 
 16. See United States v. Delgado, 797 F. Supp. 213 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 17. United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that Customs agent’s 
patdown of a traveler going from Puerto Rico to the Dominican Republic was a routine border 
search resulting in no Fourth Amendment violation even where there was no reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause); United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61-62 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
searching an individual’s shoes immediately after clearing airport customs is a routine border 
search); United States v. Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213, 1219 (7th Cir. 1981) (“The suspicion justifying a 
patdown search, like that required for a strip search, must be based on objective factors and judged 
in light of the experience of the Customs agents. Also, in assessing these objective factors the factors 
relevant in strip search cases apply equally to the propriety of a patdown search.”); United States v. 
Kallevig, 534 F.2d 411, 414 (1st Cir. 1976) (border search less intrusive than strip search and 
requires no level of suspicion by Customs officials); infra Part II.D. 
 18. United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d. Cir. 1983); see also United States v. 
Turner, 639 F. Supp. 982, 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
    
353] RIGHTS AT UNITED STATES BORDERS 357 
 
photocopy material routinely inspected at the border.19 The government 
may also install electronic devices in the articles searched to track 
contraband discovered during a valid border search.20
Although officials are granted great latitude in what may be 
searched, certain actions are forbidden or require a finding of probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion. A border search may be held nonroutine 
and held a violation of the Fourth Amendment if it is too long, 
excessively intrusive, or based on an improper motive.21
 
1.  Permitted duration of border searches 
 
A border search that takes too long to complete may be classified as 
a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A seizure occurs when a 
person or thing is not free to depart.22 At borders, a person is seized and 
not free to go for the length of time it takes to conduct a routine border 
search. However, once that routine search has been completed, the 
person must be allowed to leave unless there is reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause.23
Courts use various metrics to determine when the duration of a 
routine search causes it to become a seizure. For example, the length of 
time people are usually detained may set a benchmark for the length of 
the maximum permissible routine stop.24 In the context of international 
airports, one could consider a blanket rule where seizures that cause 
people to miss connecting flights are per se nonroutine and require 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.25
The general rule for border stops is that routine searches are exempt 
from the Fourth Amendment, but nonroutine searches must be supported 
by at least reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause.26 Any detention 
longer than necessary to conduct a valid, routine search is nonroutine. 27 
Because each case differs, it is difficult to ascertain an exact time 
requirement though non-border Fourth Amendment cases provide some 
guidance. The analysis used for non-border Fourth Amendment cases, 
 19. See United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 20. See United States v. Most, 789 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding lawful the 
placement of a monitoring device inside package after a lawful search uncovered heroin valid). 
 21. See supra note 17. 
 22. See generally the cases cited supra note 17. 
 23. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); United States v. Ek, 676 
F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982) (requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause whenever a search 
exceeds the length of a routine search).
 24. See generally the cases cited supra note 17. 
 25. See cases cited supra note 17. 
 26. See supra note 17. 
 27. Id. 
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where reasonable suspicion and probable cause are required, can also 
provide guidance for nonroutine border searches, which likewise involve 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause. 
The Supreme Court has held that a two-hour search with no evidence 
justifying further detention violates the Fourth Amendment.28 
Furthermore, customs agents who detain someone in a nonroutine search 
cannot detain that person unless they are taking reasonable steps to 
determine whether a valid reason for continuing the detention exists.29 
The Supreme Court relaxes normal Fourth Amendment requirements 
somewhat in cases in which an officer suspects a vehicle may contain 
illegal aliens.30 The Court justifies these illegal alien stops as borderline 
between a border stop and a non-border stop, thus permitting the officer 
to conduct routine searches.31 However, “any further detention or search 
must be based on consent or probable cause.”32
In United States v. Place, the Court held that the detention of 
defendant’s luggage for ninety minutes without probable cause was 
unreasonable.33 Although declining to specify the maximum appropriate 
length of time for a detention, Place indicated that courts should take 
into account “whether the police diligently pursue[d] their 
investigation.”34 Further, the Court noted that agents should “accurately 
inform [the particular individual] of the place to which they were 
transporting his luggage, the length of time he might be dispossessed, 
and of what arrangements would be made for return of the luggage if the 
investigation dispelled the suspicion.”35
The Supreme Court has not stated how long a border search must be 
to require reasonable suspicion or probable cause. However, the unique 
circumstance of a border search may require a shorter time limit than two 
hours or ninety minutes. For example, a shorter detention, such as one of 
twenty minutes with the relevant official taking reasonable steps to 
investigate the propriety of further detention, could be a valid routine 
 28. See United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that a two-hour delay without probable cause while drug-sniffing dog was obtained was a violation 
of a passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 
United States v. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 29. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (finding no Fourth Amendment 
violation where Drug Enforcement Administration agent diligently pursued his investigation and no 
delay unnecessary to the investigation was involved). 
 30. See supra note 11. 
 31. Id. 
 32. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 713 (1983). 
 33. Id. at 698. 
 34. Id. at 709. 
 35. Id. at 710. 
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border search.36
Any stop or search that causes a person to miss a normally 
connecting flight is arguably per se a nonroutine stop or search that must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion.37 Airlines know that 
internationally connecting passengers must pass through customs and 
often undergo routine searches. The airlines account for the length of 
time a routine search will take and add extra time to ensure that 
passengers will be able to arrive in time for their connecting flights after 
passing through customs. Arguably, any passenger delayed long enough 
to miss a connecting flight has undergone a per se nonroutine stop or 
search that must be supported by reasonable suspicion. 
 
2.  Permitted intrusiveness of border searches 
 
A border search may become nonroutine due to intrusiveness when it 
goes outside the bounds of a normal stop, i.e. when it is perceptively 
outside the scope of normal activity.38 In dicta, the Supreme Court has 
given examples of what would be nonroutine searches, including “strip, 
body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.”39 However, the Court 
expressed “no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for 
[such] nonroutine border searches,” thus leaving the area open to 
interpretation by lower courts.40
The First Circuit has compiled a non-exhaustive list of six factors to 
be considered when determining the permitted degree of invasiveness or 
intrusiveness of a border search: 
 
(1) whether the search required the suspect to disrobe or expose any 
intimate body parts; (2) whether physical contact was made with the 
suspect during the search; (3) whether force was used; (4) whether the 
type of search exposed the suspect to pain or danger; (5) the overall 
manner with which the search was conducted; and (6) whether the 
suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, were abrogated by 
 36. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (where Drug Enforcement 
Administration agent diligently pursued his investigation and no delay unnecessary to the 
investigation was involved, a twenty minute detention of a suspect met Fourth Amendment’s 
standard of reasonableness). 
 37. See supra note 17. 
 38. United States v. Ventura, 947 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D. Puerto Rico 1996) (stating that 
“secondary questioning” is not per se custodial. An “experience must be perceptibly outside the 
routine Customs process.”); United States v. Beras, 918 F. Supp. 38 (D. Puerto Rico 1996) 
(removing suspect from stream of activity and questioning singly or searching constitutes a situation 
in which Miranda warnings attach). 
 39. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
 40. Id. 
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the search.41
 
The First Circuit noted that based on these factors, only strip searches 
and body cavity searches are consistently nonroutine.42 Reasonable 
suspicion is required for other types of similarly intrusive searches.43  
 
3.  Impermissible motives for border searches 
 
In addition to duration and intrusiveness, the motivation for a 
nonroutine border search may make it impermissible. A border search 
that is otherwise permissible may still be invalid where the search is 
motivated by consideration of race, for the purpose of delay, or a 
manifestation of ill-will. 
In the context of judicial determination of probable cause after an 
arrest, the Supreme Court has stated “examples of unreasonable delay are 
delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the 
arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or 
delay for delay’s sake.”44 Furthermore, reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause can never be based on race. Courts highly disfavor any stop 
motivated solely by race whether in conjunction with the border or not.45
These rules may be used to determine what constitutes an 
 41. United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 42. Id. at 512-13; see also United States v. Reyes, 821 F.2d 168, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(holding that reasonable suspicion is required that a defendant is concealing contraband for a strip 
search at the border); United States v. Adekunle, 2 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding reasonable suspicion that a person is carrying 
drugs outside their body ‘may insulate’ strip searches of that individual at the border from Fourth 
Amendment challenges); United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995)(finding that the 
“real suspicion” standard for a strip search at the border was met where the defendant appeared 
glassy-eyed, had taken one-day trip to Hawaii from Guam, a pat-down revealed that the defendant 
was wearing two pairs of underwear in tropical climate and the defendant had a suspicious bulge 
under his pants); United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984) (requiring 
reasonable suspicion evidenced by particularized, articulable facts for strip searches at the border). 
 43. See Adekunle, 2 F.3d at 562 (requiring reasonable suspicion for continued detention and 
x-ray examination of suspected alimentary canal drug smuggler at the border); Oyekan, 786 F.2d at 
837 (holding that reasonable suspicion is required for x-ray search of defendant at the border); 
United States v. Gonzalez-Rincon, 36 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1994); Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1349; 
United States v. Handy, 788 F.2d 1419, 1420-21 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that “clear indication” that 
defendant carried drugs internally is required for body cavity search at the border); United States v. 
Pino, 729 F.2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that rectal searches require a higher level of 
suspicion than strip or x-ray searches; experienced official must believe defendant is carrying drugs 
in rectal area to justify rectal search at the border); see also Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d 428 
(9th Cir. 1995) (denying summary judgment on issue of six-day detention without hearing of 
allegedly deportable permanent resident); Audrey Benison, Matthew J. Gardner & Amy S. Manning, 
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 87 GEO. L.J. 1124, nn.309-10 (1999). 
 44. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); United States v. Ek, 676 
F. 2d 379 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Faherty, 692 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 45. See generally Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); infra Part II.B.3. 
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unreasonable delay in Fourth Amendment border cases. Although border 
cases are different in that Fourth Amendment protections are diminished 
and routine stops and searches are expected, nonroutine border searches 
involve the extension of a routine search beyond what is justified by 
constitutionally permitted regulation of international trade. Accordingly, 
there must be a legitimate motive for a nonroutine stop or search.46 
Delaying someone only until a connecting flight departs, for example, 
would qualify as delay motivated by ill will or made for delay’s sake.47
Border patrol agents and customs agents cannot lawfully stop 
someone based solely on that person’s race, regardless of whether the 
stop is routine.48 Although race cannot be used to support reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause,49 as a practical matter and based on 
examination of the authorities cited herein, no reasonable suspicion is 
needed to conduct a routine search at a border. A customs agent might 
therefore routinely search people he would not have routinely searched 
solely because of their race or ethnicity. However, the Supreme Court 
has held that stopping a deportee solely on basis of his apparent race is 
an “egregious constitutional violation.”50 Race might be a factor as to 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion if it matches a description of an 
offender or fits the facts relevant to a particular person, place, or 
circumstance of an offense.51
 
C.  Detaining Property 
 
For search and seizure purposes, detaining property is the same as 
detaining the person who owns the property.52 When a person is not free 
 46. See supra note 17. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975); United States v. 
Anderson, 923 F. 2d 450, 455 (6th Cir. 1991); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 
1070 (7th Cir. 1976). But see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985), 
quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-563 (1976). 
 50. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1442-43 (suppressing evidence and stating that border patrol 
agents’ “stop, which resulted solely from Gonzalez’ Hispanic appearance, constituted a bad faith and 
egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment”); see also United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 
F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that a person’s racial characteristics are insufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify detention after a checkpoint stop conducted substantial 
distance from Mexican border). 
 51. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 336 (1959); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 
1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Ruiz, 961 F. Supp 1524, 1532 (D. Utah 1997). 
 52. See United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(detaining currency equivalent to detaining the person whose currency is detained); United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 713 (1983) (ninety minute detention of luggage without probable cause was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
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to leave without abandoning luggage or plane tickets, that person is not 
free to leave and is seized the same as if that person were in jail.53 The 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mendenhall recites among 
other factors indicating a seizure the “prolonged retention of a person’s 
personal effects, such as airplane tickets or identification.”54 In United 
States v. McCain,55 the Court found that a woman was in custody for 
Miranda purposes when she could leave only by abandoning her 
luggage.56 Forcing a person to choose between abandoning one’s luggage 
and staying “is a sufficient restriction on one’s freedom of action so as to 
trigger the giving of Miranda warnings before proceeding with any 
interrogation.”57
 
D.  Reasonableness of Border Stops and Searches 
 
The reasonableness of a border stop or search is relevant only when a 
stop and search is nonroutine. Since routine border stops and searches are 
exempted from the Fourth Amendment, no determination of 
reasonableness attaches.58 When a stop or search becomes nonroutine, 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires 
reasonable suspicion.59 If a stop or search reaches the level of full arrest, 
or is sufficiently invasive, there must be probable cause in addition to 
reasonable suspicion.60
 
1.  Facts as a whole considered 
 
Courts have been reluctant to draw bright lines defining 
reasonableness, relying instead on a fact-dependent evaluation of various 
factors.61 However, the reasonableness requirement is not eviscerated 
 53. See $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051; Place, 462 U.S. 696. 
 54. United States v. Rogers, 2000 WL 101235, *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 55. 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 56. Id. at 255. 
 57. Id. But see Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925 (3rd Cir. 1984) (man not in custody for 
Miranda purposes when girlfriend is being questioned and is not free to leave), overruling on other 
grounds recognized by Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
 58. But see infra Part II.B.3 concerning the impermissibility of stops based only on race or 
ethnicity. 
 59. See supra note 17. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See United States v. Martinez, 481 F. 2d 214 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that border 
searches must be reasonable, which requires a determination of surrounding facts); see also United 
States v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 
976-77 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that test of 
reasonableness of border search was whether all facts viewed as a whole by experienced customs 
inspector would lead to necessary satisfaction of real suspicion test); Huguez v. United States, 406 
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simply because underlying facts are viewed as a whole.62 Although 
courts wish to have the discretion to view all the facts together, a few 
broad rules have been established as discussed below.63
 
2.  Basic standard for reasonable suspicion 
 
In the context of border searches, reasonableness issues most often 
arise in cases involving alimentary canal smuggling that are difficult to 
detect. Effectively preventing it without creating great costs for law-
abiding individuals poses an enormous challenge. Accordingly, an 
examination of such cases provides a good discussion as to the basic 
definition of reasonable suspicion. 
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,64 the Court refused to 
create a “clear indication” standard lying between reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause, stating that such a test tended to “obscure rather than 
elucidate.”65 The Court further held that “the detention of a traveler at the 
border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is 
justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts 
surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler 
is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.” 66 In a prior decision, 
the Court held that officials at the border must have a “particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the particular person” of alimentary canal 
smuggling before proceeding with any intrusive tests or lengthy 
detentions.67
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) . 
 62. See United States v. Diemler, 428 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir. 1974) (“It has also been 
consistently held that border searches are not entirely exempt from the Fourth Amendment but 
rather are subject to the requirement that they be reasonable” (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Rodriguez-Hernandez, 493 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829, (1971). 
 63. See Zimmermann v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583, 585 (3rd Cir. 1939) (finding that a search is 
“unreasonable” when it is out of proportion to the end sought); United Stated v. Aman, 624 F.2d 
911, 913 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that no per se requirement of a warrant exists for a body cavity 
search; the warrant is merely one fact to consider in deciding reasonableness); United States v. 
Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that intrusions, such as strip searches, require 
reasonable suspicion; reasonableness measured by balancing the warranted suspicion of the border 
official with the offensiveness of the intrusion); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 
473 U.S. 531, 543-44 (1985) (stating that officers acted reasonably in holding suspect for sixteen 
hours while waiting for suspect to have bowel movement after concluding that the suspect had 
swallowed balloons containing cocaine and where suspect refused x-ray or other methods of 
determining truth or falsity of smuggling suspicion). 
 64. 473 U.S. 531, 540 (1985). 
 65. Id. at 541. 
 66. United States v. Saldarriaga-Marin, 734 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1984) (permitting Customs 
agents to detain a suspected internal drug smuggler until nature reveals the truth or falsity of 
suspicions). 
 67. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, (1981), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
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3.  Factors that can be used in determination of reasonable suspicion 
 
The Supreme Court and the circuit courts have handed down multi-
factored tests used to evaluate reasonable suspicion. In United States v. 
Sokolow,68 the Supreme Court found that reasonable suspicion existed 
where the suspect (1) paid his plane fare in cash; (2) traveled under a 
name that did not match the name under which his telephone number was 
listed; (3) was originally traveling to city known to be a source city for 
illegal drugs; (4) appeared nervous during his trip; and (5) checked none 
of his luggage.69
The Circuits “are substantially in accord concerning the factors 
which may be taken into account in determining the issue of 
reasonableness.”70 Those factors include: 
(1) Excessive nervousness;71
(2) Unusual conduct;72
(3) An informant’s tip;73
21 n.18 (1968); see also Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541-42. 
 68. 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989). 
 69. Id.; see also United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1985) (defendants flight 
from plane was insufficient to support finding of probable cause to search plane; Customs agent 
climbing on plane constituted highly intrusive trespass; defendants possessed reasonable expectation 
of privacy as to the interior of plane; government agent’s conduct in climbing on plane and peering 
in windshield constituted unreasonable search within meaning of Fourth Amendment); United States 
v. Lavado, 750 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the length of time that non-customs officers 
can maintain status quo at the border or its functional equivalent, awaiting arrival of persons with 
Customs authority, must be brief); United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1980) cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981) (holding that detention during which police moved defendant from a 
taxi, to caged back seat of police car, while waiting for customs officers, to airport manager’s office 
for questioning by customs officials was a Terry stop rather than arrest); United States v. Wardlaw, 
576 F.2d 932 (1st Cir. 1978) (explaining that searching a person is okay when reasonable suspicion 
exists); United States v. Wilmot, 563 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that while a pat-down 
search by customs officials might become so extensive that it would be unreasonable without 
sufficient factors in addition to entry into the country, the facts of the instant case did not present 
such a situation; furthermore, defendant’s suspicious conduct, during course of secondary inspection, 
in resisting the mere spreading of his legs clearly constituted a reasonable basis for an “extensive” 
pat-down search; and once the officers felt an object in the groin area during the justified pat-down 
inspection, there was the requisite suspicion to justify a strip search); United States v. Turner, 639 F. 
Supp. 982, 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“The border search exception does not, of course, completely 
eviscerate the protections of the Fourth Amendment merely because the search takes place at the 
border or its functional equivalent. Customs Inspectors, for example, must have ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ before they may detain an incoming traveler for a search beyond the normal, routine 
Customs search and inspection, e.g., for a strip search.”). 
 70. United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 976 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 71. See United States v. Chiarito, 507 F.2d 1098, 1100 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Diaz, 503 F.2d 1025, 1026 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1974). 
 72. See Diaz, 503 F.2d at 1026 n.1; United States v. Shields, 453 F.2d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). 
 73. See United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Castle, 
409 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 975 (1969). But see Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 
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(4) Computerized information showing pertinent criminal 
propensities;74
(5) Loose-fitting or bulky clothing;75
(6) An itinerary suggestive of wrongdoing,76 (e.g. traveling to or 
from a country known for exporting drugs); 
(7) Discovery of incriminating matter during routine searches;77
(8) Lack of employment or a claim of self-employment;78
(9) Needle marks or other indications of drug addiction;79
(10) Information derived from the search or conduct of a traveling 
companion;80
(11) Inadequate luggage;81
(12) Evasive or contradictory answers.82
 
4.  Reasonable suspicion with respect to contraband: a special case 
 
Customs officials are permitted to search for contraband. Contraband 
includes smuggled items that are legal in the United States but are 
brought into the United States illegally.83 Contraband also includes items 
which are illegal in the United States and which cannot enter under any 
circumstance.84
A particularized rule for determining reasonable suspicion applies to 
smuggled items that can be legally possessed within the United States. 
When a customs agent finds an item that may be legally possessed in the 
United States but is possibly being brought illegally into the United 
States, the customs agent has reasonable suspicion to search further to 
268 (2000) (holding that “anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more” not 
sufficient “to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that person”). 
 74. See United States v. Kallevig, 534 F.2d 411, 412, 414 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 75. See id. at 414; Chiarito, 507 F.2d at 1099; Diaz, 503 F.2d at 1026 n.1. 
 76. See Kallevig, 534 F.2d at 414; Chiarito, 507 F.2d at 1100; Diaz, 503 F.2d at 1026 n.1; 
Shields, 453 F.2d at 1236. 
 77. See United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 400, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
989 (1974); United States v. Flores, 477 F.2d 608, 609 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973); 
United States v. Summerfield, 421 F.2d 684, 685 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 78. See United States v. Smith, 557 F.2d 1206, 1209 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1073 (1978). 
 79. See Shields, 453 F.2d at 1236. 
 80. See Wilson, 488 F.2d at 402; United States v. Gil de Avila, 468 F.2d 184, 186-87 (9th 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973). 
 81. See Smith, 557 F.2d at 1209; United States v. Diaz, 503 F.2d 1025, 1026 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1974); United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 82. United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 976 (2d Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted); 
see also United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 996 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 
(1977). 
 83. See generally Title 18 of the United States Code. 
 84. Id. 
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determine whether the item is being brought legally into the country.85 
For example, if a person entering the United States has a drug that is 
illegal to have without a prescription, a customs agent finding the drug 
during a routine search probably has reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
nonroutine search for the prescription to determine whether the drug is 
properly entering the country.86
 
E.  Border Search Exception Applies Only to Customs and Immigration 
Laws 
 
Warrantless border searches without reasonable suspicion are 
permitted only at the border for the purpose of enforcing laws related to 
smuggling, immigration, and other laws which customs and border 
agents are charged to enforce.87 The relaxed Fourth Amendment 
requirements for routine border searches are based on the powers granted 
Congress to regulate foreign trade.88 Accordingly, the border search 
exception only applies to the laws that customs and border agents are 
charged with enforcing at international borders or their functional 
equivalents.89
In traditional law enforcement situations, an official must normally 
show reasonable suspicion to conduct a search in order to obtain a 
warrant or fit within an exception to the warrant requirement.90 However, 
a border search can be conducted for any reason without reasonable 
suspicion. Therefore, customs agents are in a position to look for 
 85. See cases cited supra notes 17, 68, 70. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973). 
 88. See generally U.S.CONST. art. I. 
 89. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (holding that except at the 
border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol can stop vehicles only if they are 
aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably 
warrant suspicion that vehicles contain aliens who might be in the country illegally); United States v. 
Massie, 65 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that border patrol agents at a routine, fixed checkpoint 
stop may question briefly about cargo, destination, and travel plans, as long as such questions are 
reasonably related to agent’s duty to prevent unauthorized entry and to prevent smuggling); United 
States v. Newell, 506 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the mere fact that automobile fifty-six 
miles north of Mexican border was occupied by two women who were alone at night and that 
automobile bore license plates from an adjacent county was not sufficient to give rise to reasonable 
suspicion that the occupants or the vehicle had been involved in violation of a custom or 
immigration law); United States v. Diemler, 498 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir. 1974), citing United 
States v. Storm, 480 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1973) (“the reasonable suspicion must be not merely of any 
violation, but of a Customs or immigration violation”); United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. Solis, 469 F. 2d 1113, 1114-
1115, n.2 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 932 (1973). But see United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411 (1981) (holding that a peace officer may stop and question person if there is a reasonable 
ground to believe that such person is wanted for past criminal conduct). 
 90. See supra note 17. 
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evidence of other wrongdoing during a border search. The potential 
exists for customs agents to hand evidence obtained during a valid border 
search to criminal prosecutors. However, courts can suppress such 
evidence under the exclusionary rule and exclude evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, a roving border patrol was 
subject to Fourth Amendment limits.91 The border officials were 
enforcing immigration and smuggling laws, but they were not at the 
border.92 Conversely, customs agents that enforce non-immigration and 
non-smuggling laws at the border should not be entitled to the border 
search exception; although because the exception allows for such broad, 
unfettered searching, at least initially, this distinction is probably 
unenforceable as a practical matter. 
 
III.  FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS DURING BORDER SEARCHES 
 
Corresponding with the border exception to the Fourth Amendment 
is an exception to the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination permitting routine questioning at international borders and 
their equivalents.93 Each person entering the United States may therefore 
be required to complete a declaration. These declarations are not invalid 
under the Fifth Amendment.94 Courts in the past have held a declaration 
that reveals an illegal substance insulates the declarant from prosecution 
because, otherwise, requiring the declaration would be in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.95 More recently courts have held that, although the 
declaration itself does not subject the declarant to prosecution, the 
possession from the point at which the border was crossed to the point of 
declaration can be prosecuted as importation of an illegal substance.96
Under Leary v. United States and United States v. Kenny, the courts 
 91. 422 U.S. 873. 
 92. Id. at 874-76. 
 93. See United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination is not offended by routine questioning of those 
seeking entry to the United States). 
 94. See Walden v. United States, 417 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1969) (“It would be strange 
indeed if one could Constitutionally be required to declare ordinary merchandise at the border and be 
punished for failure so to do, if, at the same time, surreptitious importation of contraband does not 
have to be declared and a failure to declare cannot be punished. The importation is not compelled 
and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination does not apply.”) (quoting 
Rule v. United States, 362 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 95. See Leary v. United States, 544 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that affirmative 
declaration with resulting disclosure of illegal items in the declarant’s possession results only in the 
seizure of the contraband). 
 96. See United States v. Kenny, 601 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining that possession 
from the border to the point of declaration constitutes illegal importation). 
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carefully noted that customs declarations themselves do not constitute 
requests for self-incriminating information even at borders.97 As the Fifth 
Circuit illustrated, importation of illegal substances is not compelled.98 
An additional sworn declaration, which must be completed before one is 
free to go, is compelled and the sole purpose of such an additional 
declaration is the incrimination of the person completing it. 
If the additional declaration concerns a law a person has indeed 
violated, the only apparent purpose for such an additional declaration 
would be the incrimination of the person of whom it is requested. There 
are two possibilities for people compelled to make a sworn declaration 
about an illegal act they have committed. Either they can admit in the 
sworn declaration that they acted illegally and incriminate themselves, or 
they can lie under oath and incriminate themselves for perjury. In either 
case the sole purpose served by an additional declaration is the 
incrimination of the person of whom it is demanded. As such, additional 
declarations are unlawful under the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.99 In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board 
and Marchetti v. United State, a statute requiring persons to register 
violated the Fifth Amendment because registration exposed the registrant 
to criminal prosecution.100 In a like manner, the intended result of a 
typical additional declaration seems to be the self-evident incrimination 
of the person asked to complete it. 
 
A.  Miranda 
 
In addition to prohibiting compelled declarations, the Fifth 
 97. Id. at 213. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (considering federal law requiring 
registration of certain firearms); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (holding that federal 
law requiring gamblers to register and pay excise and occupational tax violates Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege against self-incrimination); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 
(1965) (holding that federal law requiring Communist party members to register violates Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination). 
 100. United States v. Candanoza, 431 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1970); see Marchetti v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 39, 49 (1968) (holding that the “direct and unmistakable consequence” of disclosure 
requirements was the incrimination of the person making the disclosure. The “application of the 
constitutional privilege to the entire registration procedure [which called for self-incrimination] was 
in this instance neither ‘extreme’ nor ‘extravagant,’”) (quoting United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 
259, 263 (1927)); see also Candanoza, 431 F.2d at 421 (holding that statute making it criminal 
offense to smuggle marijuana into the United States without invoicing or declaring it at border did 
not violate Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. San Juan, 405 F. 
Supp. 686 (D. Vt. 1975) (stating that foreign reporting requirements of Bank Secrecy Act involve 
transactions which take place across national boundaries and, as such, involve substantial 
governmental interest which, in view of remote possibility of incrimination, do not violate 
guarantees of Fifth Amendment). 
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Amendment further requires that Miranda warnings be given prior to a 
suspect’s response to an additional declaration.101 However, routine 
questioning at a border does not require any Miranda warning.102 If a 
person is taken into custody during a border search, Miranda warnings 
must be given.103 A person is in custody when that person believes he or 
she is not free to leave.104 Threatening an individual with arrest may be 
enough to make some people actually believe that they are under arrest 
and not free to leave.105 Miranda warnings must be given in such a case 
and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination can be 
invoked.106 In the border context, a person is deemed to be in custody 
when that person has been removed from the stream of normal activity 
and taken for nonroutine questioning.107
Compelling a person to complete an additional declaration entails 
detaining that person until such declaration is made. This detention 
involves taking the person out of the stream of normal activity and is 
therefore custodial. Accordingly, Miranda warnings must be given.108
 
 
 
 101. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 102. See United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding individuals arriving 
in this country who are subjects of routine border questioning are not entitled to Miranda warnings); 
United States v. Gomez Londono, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977) (questioning about $5,000 is not a 
custodial interrogation); United States v. DeLaCruz, 420 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970) (Miranda 
warnings not necessary in routine customs searches); United States v. Ventura, 947 F. Supp. 25 (D. 
Puerto Rico 1996) (“secondary questions” are nor per se custodial . . . an experience must be 
perceptibly outside of the routine customs process); United States v. Tai-Hsing, 738 F. Supp. 389 (D. 
Or. 1990) (no Miranda warnings necessary where a person was referred to a secondary area as part 
of routine practice). 
 103. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473. 
 104. Id. at 446. 
 105. Id. at 467. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See United States v. Del Soccorro Castro, 573 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that 
person accompanied to customs search area by officers intending to arrest her was in custody for 
Miranda purposes); United States v. Beras, 918 F. Supp. 38 (D. Puerto Rico 1996) (removing 
suspect from stream of activity and questioning singly or searching constitutes a situation in which 
Miranda warnings attach); United States v. Berard, 281 F. Supp. 328 (D. Mass 1968) (holding that 
when a person is not allowed to leave after being taken to a personal search room, that person is in 
custodial interrogation where Miranda warnings must be given). 
 108. See Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 760 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that following initial 
questioning of an alien by border agent, placement of the alien in the agent’s vehicle constituted a 
seizure); United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 1651 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that to trigger 
Miranda requirements at a Customs inspection, person must reasonably believe in not being free to 
leave); United States v. Des Jardins, 772 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that no Miranda 
warnings are required “unless and until the questioning agents have probable cause to believe that 
the person questioned has committed an offense, or the person questioned has been arrested, whether 
with or without probable cause,”) (quoting United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 
1980)). 
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B.  Detaining Property and Miranda 
 
Detaining luggage or tickets is the de facto equivalent of detaining a 
person. Thus, Miranda attaches equally whether a person is not free to go 
because their body is being detained, or because their luggage or tickets 
are being detained.109 For example, in McCain v. United States, the Court 
held that permitting a suspect “to leave only if she was willing to 
abandon her luggage” was itself “a sufficient restriction on one’s 
freedom of action so as to trigger the giving of Miranda warnings before 
proceeding with any interrogation.”110
 
IV.  FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 
 
A customs agent cannot take the lawful possessions of a person 
entering the country without following certain procedures.111 Customs 
agents may seize property if it is illegal to possess that property or to 
introduce it into the United States, but they must give a receipt and a 
notice of seizure that includes a list of the property seized, where it was 
seized, the laws alleged to have been violated that gave rise to the 
seizure, and the procedure for retrieving the property.112
By definition lawfully possessed property cannot be legally seized, 
but a customs agent might nonetheless seize lawful possessions because 
of an incorrect belief that the property in question is properly subject to 
seizure. The law remedies errors by customs agents who seize material 
by mistake in that it requires a receipt and a notice of seizure.113
“Once an agent seizes property for forfeiture, he has a duty to report 
the seizure ‘immediately’ to the appropriate district Customs officer.”114 
After a forfeiture case has been referred to a United States Attorney by a 
district customs officer, it is the United States Attorney’s duty to 
investigate the facts immediately, and if necessary to begin legal 
proceedings “forthwith.”115 A proper judicial proceeding must be 
instituted within fourteen days of the seizure of property.116 For example, 
19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2004), which allows customs agents to seize 
 109. See United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a woman was in 
custody for Miranda purposes when she could only leave by abandoning her luggage). 
 110. Id. at 255. 
 111. See 19 C.F.R. § 162.31 (2004). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 19 U.S.C. § 1602 (2004). 
 115. Id. § 1604. 
 116. See 19 C.F.R. § 162.31. 
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obscene material that is being imported into the United States,117 requires 
that the government bring a forfeiture proceeding in district court after a 
seizure has taken place. Section 1305(a) does not provide for any time 
limit between an initial seizure and institution of judicial proceedings. 
The Supreme Court has concluded, however, that to save the statute from 
being unconstitutional only a fourteen-day period might be allowed.118 
Other customs laws explicitly require forfeiture proceedings within 
fourteen days.119 Any seizure process that takes an unreasonably long 
period of time violates the Fourth Amendment, since a person is deemed 
to have been seized when luggage or plane tickets are taken.120
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The border exception diminishes the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. However, both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments still 
provide limited protections. It is clear that routine border searches are 
generally exempted from the Fourth Amendment’s requirements. 
However, activities by customs agents that go beyond routine searches 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion, to justify further detention, 
or by probable cause, to justify a full arrest. Without reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, the detention of travelers at borders is 
allowed only long enough to conduct a valid, routine search. Delay 
motivated by ill will or by other improper causes is not permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Interrogations going beyond a routine border search and requests to 
complete an additional declaration can violate the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self- incrimination, especially when no Miranda 
warnings have previously been given. Interrogation also violates the 
privilege against self-incrimination when the privilege has been invoked. 
 117. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1971). 
 118. Id.; see also United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242 (1986) (due process rights not 
violated when government took thirty-six days to decide petition on undeclared car released on 
$25,000 when posted two weeks after being seized); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm 
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (statute prescribing forfeiture of obscene material at border was 
constitutional – Congress has broad powers to regulate international commerce); Gete v. INS, 121 
F.3d 1285 (9th Cir. 1997) (aliens whose vehicles were seized by the INS for allegedly transporting 
unauthorized aliens were entitled under Fifth Amendment’s due process clause to more than mere 
notice that they could choose between judicial and administrative proceedings, and timely 
processing of their claims if they elected administrative forfeiture). 
 119. 19 U.S.C. § 1603. 
 120. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 713 (1983). 
